长征（红军的成长）/The Long March（二）
"1929年秋天，红军挺进江西北部，攻占了许多城市，多次打败了国民党军队。一军团在前进到离南昌很近的时候，突然转向西方，向长沙进发，在进军中，一军团同彭德怀会师了，彭德怀层一度占领长沙，但为了避免遭占极大优势的敌军所包围而被迫撤出。彭德怀在1929年4月曾不得不离开井冈山到赣南活动，结果他的部队大大增加了。1930年4月，他在瑞金同朱德和红军主力重新会合，接着召开了会议，决定彭德怀的三军团在湘赣边界活动，朱德和我转入福建。1930年6月，三军团和一军团再次会师，开始第二次攻打长沙，一、三军团合并为一方面军，由朱德任总司令，我任政委。在这种领导下，我们到达了长沙城外。”
"In the autumn of 1929 the Red Army moved into northern Kiangsi, attacking and occupying many cities, and inflicing numerous defeats on Kuomintang armies. When within striking distance of Nanchang the First Army Corps turned sharply west and moved on Changsha. In this drive it met and joined forces with P'eng Teh-huai, who had already occupied Changsha once, but had been forced to withdraw to avoid being surrounded by vastly superior enemy troops. P'eng had been obliged to leave Chingkangshan in April, 1929, and had carried out operations in southern Kiangsi, resulting in greatly increasing his April, 1930, and after a conference it was decided that Peng's Third Army should operate on the Kiangsi-Hunnan border, while Chu Teh and I moved into Fukien. It was in June, 1930, that the Third Army and the Frist Army, with Chu Teh as commande-in-chief and myself as political commissar. Under this leadership we arrived outside the walls of Changsha."
“大致在这个时候，中国工农革命委员会成立了，我当选为主席。红军在湖南有广泛的影响，几乎和在江西一样，湖南农名都知道我的名字，因为悬了很大的赏格不论死活要缉拿我、朱德和其他红军将领。我在湘潭的地被国民党没收了。我的妻子和我的妹妹、还有我的兄弟毛泽民、毛泽覃两个人的妻子和我自己的儿子，都被何健逮捕了。我的妻子和妹妹被杀害了，其余的后来得到释放，红军的威名甚至于扩展到湘潭我自己的村里，因为我听到一个故事，说当地的农民相信我不久就会回到家乡去，有一天，一架飞机从上空飞过，他们就断定飞机上坐的是我。他们警告那时种我地的人，说我回来看我的地了， 看看地里有没有树木被砍掉。他们说，如果有砍掉的，我一定会向蒋介石要求赔偿。”
“The Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee was organized about this time, and I was elected chairman. The Red Army's influence in Hunan was widespread, almost as much as in Kiangsi. My name was known amng the Hunanese peasants, for big rewards were offered for my capture, dead or alive , as well as for Chu Teh and other Reds. My land in Hsiang T'an was confiscated by the Kuomintang. My wife and my sister, as well as the wives of my two bothers. Mao Tse-min and Mao Tse-t'an, and my own sons were all arrested by Ho Chien. My wife and my sister were executed. The others were later released. The prestige of the Red Army even extended to my own village, in Hsiang T'an, for I heard the tale that the local peasants believed that I would be soon returning to my native home. When one day an airplane passed overhead, they decided it was I . They warned the man who was then tilling my land that I had come back to look over my old farm, to see whether or not any trees had been cut. If so, I would surely demand compensation from Chiang Kai-shek, they said"
“但是第二次打长沙失败了，国民党派来了大批援军，城内有重兵防守，9月间，又有新的部队纷纷开到湖南来攻打红军，在围城期间，只发生一次重大战斗，红军在这次战斗中消灭了敌人两个旅，但是，它没有能占领长沙，几星期以后就撤到江西去了。”
“But the second attack on Changsha proved to be a failure, Great reinforcemens had been sent to the city and it was heavily garrisoned; besides, new troops were pouring into Hunan in September to attack the Red Army. Only one important battle occurred during the siege, and in it the Red Army eliminated two brigades of enemy troops. It could not, however, take the city of Changsha, and after a few weeks withdrew to Kiangsi."
“这次失败有助于摧毁李立三路线，并使红军不必按照李立三所要求的那样对武汉作可能招致惨败的进攻。红军当时的主要任务是补充新的兵员，在新的农村地区实施苏维埃化，尤其重要的是苏维埃政权的坚强领导下巩固红军攻克的地区。为了这些目的，没有必要打长沙，这件事本身含有冒险的成分。然而如果第一次的占领只是一种暂时的行动，不想固守这个城市，并且在那里建立政权的话，那么，它的效果也可以认为是有益处的，因为这对全国革命运动所产生的反响是非常大的。企图把长沙当做一种根据地，而不在后面巩固苏维埃政权，这在战略和战术上都是错误的。”
"This failure helped to destroy the Li Li-san line and saved the Red Army from what would probably have been a catastrophic attack on Wuhan, which Li was demanding. The main tasks of the Red Army then were the recruiting of new troops, the sovietization of new rural areas, and ,above all, the consolidation under thorough soviet power of such areas as already had fallen to the REd Army. For such a program the attacks on Changsha were not necessary and had an element of adventure in them. Had the first occupation been undertaken as a temporary action, however, and not with the idea of attempting to hold the city and set up a state power there, its effects might have been considered beneficial, for the reaction produced on the national revolutionary movement was very great. The error was a strategic and tactical one, in attempiting to make a base of Changsha wihiel the soviet power was still not consolidated behind it."
“但是李立三即过高估了那时候红军的军事力量，也过高估了全国政局的革命因素。他认为革命已经接近胜利，很快就要在全国掌握政权。当时助长他这种信心的，是蒋介石和冯玉祥之间的旷日持久、消耗力量的内战，这使李立三认为形式十分有利。但是红军看来，敌人正准备内战一停，就大举进攻苏区，这不是进行可能招致惨败的盲动和冒险的时候，这种估计后来证明是完全正确的。”
“But Li Li-san overstimated both the military strength of the Red Army at that time and the revolutionary factors in the national political scene. He believed that the revolution was nearing success and would shortly have power over the entire country. This belief was encouraged by the long and exhausting civil war then proceeding betwen Feng Yuhsiang and Chiang Kai-shek, which made the outlook seem highly favorable to Li Li-san. But in the opinon of the Red Army the enemy was making preparations for a great drive against the soviets as soon as the civil war was concluded, and it was no time for possibly disastrous putschism and adventures. This estimate proved to be entirely correct."
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